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In the last decade, researchers have shown burgeoning interest in issues at the intersection of emotion and law. Given the longstanding interest in emotion among social (and
other) psychologists, most of this research has come from a psychological perspective, but
it also includes work with a legal, sociological, philosophical, and neuroscience ﬂavor.
The issues are theoretical as well as practical, inﬂuencing both psychological theories of
emotion and matters of legal practice and policy.
The law adopts a double standard in its treatment of emotion. In some areas, the law
explicitly addresses emotion as a legitimate consideration, but in other areas, the law denies emotion any role in legal decision making. For example, legal analysis requires decision makers to consider the emotional reactions of others when classifying certain offenses for purposes of criminal culpability (e.g., “hate crimes” and “crimes of passion”),
awarding damages for emotional injuries (e.g., mental suffering and emotional distress),
and allowing jurors’ moral judgments to inﬂuence certain consequential decisions such as
punitive damages, capital sentencing, and jury nulliﬁcation. At the same time, the courts
make what may be untenable presumptions when they require factﬁnders to ignore their
affective states and evaluate evidence, such as gory crime scene photographs, dispassionately. Thus, the ﬁeld of law and emotion is ripe for scholarly exploration.
This Special Issue samples some of the ways in which emotion is relevant to legal issues. The ﬁrst two papers, by Terry Maroney and by Neil Feigenson and Jaihyun Park, locate the topic of emotion in legal judgment within a broader theoretical framework. Maroney asks the question of whether law and emotion, as a distinct research ﬁeld, deserves
the status of other “law-and” movements, such as law-and-psychology, law-and-economics, etc. Drawing on scholarship in a number of disciplines (e.g., psychology, law, sociology, and philosophy), she supports the academic status of law and emotion by presenting a descriptive taxonomy of this new ﬁeld. In addition to organizing extant research on
the topic, this taxonomy identiﬁes gaps in the existing literature and suggests areas for future research.
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The paper by Feigenson and Park takes a somewhat narrower focus. It reviews research on the role of emotion in a speciﬁc type of legal judgment, namely, attributions
of responsibility and blame. These sorts of attributions, which occur in a variety of social situations, are especially relevant to legal decision making in the negligence context
(Feigenson, 2000). Drawing on the extensive research on affect and social judgment, Feigenson and Park discuss the various ways in which emotions and moods can inﬂuence
factﬁnders’ attributions of responsibility, and they propose a model that distinguishes
among different types of affective inﬂuences. Their model effectively integrates and organizes prior research on emotion and attribution in the jury context, and it has clear implications for conducting future research in the area. Importantly, they also consider legal
decision makers’ ability to correct for affective inﬂuences in their reasoning—that might
or might not be desirable from a normative perspective. An awareness of potential bias is
often viewed as a necessary ﬁrst step toward its elimination, but as a wealth of research
has demonstrated, it is often not sufﬁcient (Fischhoff, 1982).
The next four papers are experimental studies that address the role of emotion in legal factﬁnding. Horowitz, Kerr, Park, and Gockel ask whether informing jurors of their
nulliﬁcation power would focus the jury on emotional rather than evidentiary factors and
thereby invite “chaos” into the courtroom. They ﬁnd that emotionally biasing information
(i.e., a sympathetic vs. an unsympathetic victim) has its greatest impact when nulliﬁcation
instructions are provided in a nulliﬁcation-relevant case (i.e., euthanasia, as opposed to
murder for proﬁt). The results extend the authors’ prior work on jury nulliﬁcation (Niedermeier, Horowitz, & Kerr, 1999) by showing that one way nulliﬁcation instructions
may operate is by legitimizing emotions as valid information for jurors to use in reaching
a verdict. Moreover, they show that nulliﬁcation instructions may be problematic in some
types of cases but not others.
The study by Horowitz et al. explores the effect of emotionally biasing extra-legal information; Bright and Goodman-Delahunty, on the other hand, examine the effect of
emotionally biasing evidence presented at trial. Although courts tend to assume that
gruesome evidence will have a prejudicial effect on jurors’ verdicts, research testing this
assumption has yielded mixed results (Bornstein & Nemeth, 1999). Bright and GoodmanDelahunty shed some light on these inconsistent ﬁndings by showing that gruesome photographic evidence exerts a stronger effect than gruesome verbal testimony, and that the
inﬂuence of the gruesome photographs is mediated by mock jurors’ anger response.
The next two papers examine how observers’ expectations of victims’ conduct inﬂuence
the way in which legal actors perceive them. Victims’ reactions to crime, especially their
emotional responses, can inﬂuence a variety of legally relevant judgments. For example, if a
victim appears untroubled by a set of injurious events, authorities might be less convinced
that a crime has actually taken place, making police less likely to investigate and prosecutors less likely to ﬁle charges. Furthermore, victims’ emotional reactions, both at the time of
the crime and while testifying, can affect their credibility at trial. Rose, Nadler, and Clark explore these issues within the context of victim impact evidence during the sentencing phase
of a criminal trial, by crossing a crime victim’s emotional reaction (severe vs. mild) with the
seriousness of the crime (e.g., armed robbery vs. pickpocketing). They ﬁnd that there is not
a simple effect of emotion in this context, but rather that people expect victims to match
the intensity of their emotional response to the seriousness of the event (i.e., they adhere to
a proportionality rule in evaluating victims’ credibility). Interestingly, they report that although a victim’s emotional response affects various measures of how mock jurors perceive
the victim, it does not affect their recommended punishment for the defendant.
The following paper by Wessel, Drevland, Eilertsen, and Magnussen shows that these
effects are not inevitable. Like Rose et al., they manipulate a crime victim’s emotional response, here for an alleged acquaintance rape. Previous research (Kaufmann, Drevland,
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Wessel, Overskeid, & Magnussen, 2003) had found that, similar to the ﬁndings of the
Rose et al. study, rape victims who display a proportional and congruent emotional response (i.e., who are demonstrably upset) while talking about the event are more credible than victims who display incongruent emotion (i.e., who are positive and relaxed).
However, in this study, a sample of Norwegian judges was not affected by the victim’s
emotional response. Thus, factﬁnders’ training and experience may be capable of offsetting the unwanted effects of victims’ emotional reactions. This ﬁnding begs the question
of whether a victim’s emotional reaction should inﬂuence legal decision making. Is a very
upset victim more likely to be telling the truth than a stoic victim? Should punishment be
greater when the crime has engendered more severe emotional consequences? With respect to the ﬁrst question, a speaker’s emotional demeanor can be a reliable cue to his or
her veracity (Vrij, 2000); whereas with regard to the second question, the mere admissibility of victim impact evidence suggests that courts do view a crime’s emotional impact as a
legitimate consideration in sentencing (Greene, 1999).
The Special Issue concludes with a paper by Wiener, Bornstein, and Voss, which draws
on research in social and cognitive psychology to show how theories of judgment and decision making that incorporate decision makers’ affective responses apply to various legal
contexts. It takes two widely used models of decision making, the rational actor and lens
models, and illustrates their utility for understanding legal judgments by using them to
interpret existing research ﬁndings in the areas of juror decision making, people’s obedience to the law (e.g., paying taxes), and eyewitness memory.
Although the present set of papers makes a valuable contribution to the study of emotion in legal judgment, the work represented here also makes apparent that psycholegal
researchers have merely scratched the surface of this vibrant ﬁeld. As the reviews by Maroney, Feigenson, and Park, and Wiener et al. make all too clear, this Special Issue represents only a small fraction of the research possibilities at the intersection of law and
emotion. For example, emotion is of paramount importance in addressing issues such as
the effects of stress on eyewitness memory (Deffenbacher, Bornstein, Penrod, & McGorty,
2004), the causes and consequences of hate crimes (Boeckmann & Turpin-Petrosino, 2002),
a number of clinical-forensic issues, such as emotional disorders in criminal populations
(e.g., psychopathy; see Hare, 1996), and the assessment.of emotional injuries in civil litigation (Goodman-Delahunty & Foote, 1995). And this is by no means an exhaustive list.
As Editors of this Special Issue, we ﬁnd it encouraging that so many scholars, from diverse ﬁelds, are beginning to turn their attention to the role of emotion in legal decision
making; and at the same time, we are excited by the many challenging questions that researchers have not yet begun to address.
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